Voting Rights and the Constitution: The Disenfranchisement of Non-English Speaking Citizens by Guerra, Sandra




In 1980, more than twenty-three million Americans spoke languages
other than English in their homes.' Most non-English speaking Ameri-
cans are native-born citizens, who have a constitutional right to vote. Yet
before the enactment of the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
which require multilingual voting assistance' in areas with large numbers
of non-English speakers,' people who did not understand English were
effectively disenfranchised by elections held only in English.
These multilingual election provisions of the Voting Rights Act, how-
ever, do not sufficiently guarantee non-English speaking citizens' right to
vote. The language of the statute, as well as its implementation, have lim-
ited the reach of this federal statutory right." Some localities supplement
the Voting Rights Act protection through state and local multilingual vot-
ing legislation.5 However, political organizations in many states currently
are promoting state constitutional amendments, commonly referred to as
"English Language Amendments," which would designate English as the
official language of those states.' Critics of the "English-only" movement
anticipate that states will attempt to use these amendments to bar the pro-
vision of multilingual voting assistance except as required by the Voting
Rights Act.7  That the voting rights of non-English speakers are
1. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 34 (1986).
2. Throughout this Note, "voting assistance" refers to all written and oral assistance, including
the provision of multilingual ballots.
3. The 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1982),
provide that, in any jurisdiction covered by the Act, "[wihenever any [jurisdiction] . .. provides any
registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating
to the electoral process, including ballots," it shall provide them on a multilingual basis to members of
applicable language minority groups.
4. See infra note 26.
5. See infra note 30.
6. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at A7, col. 2. Efforts to amend the federal constitution also persist.
See, e.g., Note, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 519, 519 (1985); Note, Language Minority Voting Rights and the English Language Amend-
ment, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 657 (1987).
7. The proponents of the English language amendments, spearheaded by a national group, U.S.
English, are opposed to multilingual elections, whether mandated by federal or state law. See ENG-
LISH UNITES US (California campaign pamphlet) (on file with author); U.S. ENGLISH, FACT SHEET:
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threatened by the English-only movement starkly reveals the inadequacies
of the Voting Rights Act as the sole guarantor of non-English speakers'
right to vote.
This Note argues that because voting is a specially protected fundamen-
tal right, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees that absent compelling justification states may not provide voting
assistance to English speakers without also providing equivalent assistance
to non-English speakers. Ensuring this right fully will require a judicial
determination that the Constitution requires states to provide multilingual
voting assistance for non-English speakers-a position that courts have yet
to adopt fully.
Section I of the Note will address the interplay between the judiciary
and Congress in the development of multilingual voting rights and will
expose the shortcomings of the current federal statutory scheme. Section II
sets forth a constitutional argument for a right to multilingual voting as-
sistance. Section III provides tentative policy suggestions for Congressional
improvement of the Voting Rights Act multilingual election provisions.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL PROTECTION OF NON-ENGLISH
SPEAKERS' RIGHT TO VOTE
A. The 1965 Voting Rights Act: Origins of Federal Protection
The restrictive reading of constitutionally protected voting rights in the
United States Supreme Court's 1959 decision in Lassiter v.
Northhampton County Board of Elections' prompted Congress to enact
the Voting Rights Act of 1965." The far-reaching provisions of the 1965
legislation were designed to eliminate literacy tests and other discrimina-
tory "tests and devices" that effectively disenfranchised blacks in the
South."0 Thus, the 1965 Voting Rights Act secured the right to vote for
BILINGUAL VOTING BALLOTS (1986) (on file with author); N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, at 23 ON 1,
col. 1; see also Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in
the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1345-47 (1987).
8. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). In Lassiter, the Supreme Court upheld the use of English literacy tests as
a means of qualifying voters in North Carolina, despite the fact that literacy tests effectively elimi-
nated a large segment of the black voting constituency. The Court found that absent invidious discrim-
ination the states could limit the franchise to literate persons "to promote intelligent use of the ballot."
Id. at 51.
A lower federal court decision extended the logic of Lassiter to require literacy specifically in Eng-
lish. Mexican-American Federation-Washington State v. Naff, 299 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1969),
vacated and remanded sub nom., Jimenez v. Naff, 400 U.S. 986 (1971) (vacated in light of Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which upheld Voting Rights Act literacy test ban). For a criticism
of Naff's misinterpretation of both Lassiter and the stricter post-Lassiter standard of review, see Note,
Constitutional Law-Voting Rights-State English Literacy Requirement Upheld, 45 WASH. L.
REV. 401 (1970).
9. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1982)).
10. In 1975, Congress made the literacy test ban permanent. See S. REnP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 774 [hereinafter 1975 S. Rep.]; see
also H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2437, 2443-44.
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English illiterates, a right that the Supreme Court had not been willing to
require as a constitutional matter.11
The 1965 statute also included a provision that recognized the need for
multilingual assistance for non-English speakers. It barred language dis-
crimination at the polls for literate Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican voters
who emigrate to the mainland."
The Voting Rights Act, in turn, has been consistently upheld by the
Supreme Court.13 The two most important Supreme Court opinions relat-
ing to the question of non-English speaking voters are the majority opin-
ion in Katzenbach v. Morgan 4 and Justice Douglas' dissent in Cardona
v. Power.5 Although they address the legality of imposing English liter-
acy requirements on non-English speaking voters, these opinions also pro-
vide a strong legal rationale for the requirement of state multilingual vot-
ing assistance. The Morgan opinion represented a significant shift in the
Court's tolerance for voting devices that exclude non-English speakers:
We are told that New York's English literacy requirement
originated in the desire to provide an incentive for non-English
speaking immigrants to learn the English language and in order to
assure the intelligent exercise of the franchise. Yet Congress might
well have questioned, in light of the many exemptions provided, and
some evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in
the enactment of the requirement, whether these were actually the
interests being served. Congress might have also questioned whether
denial of a right deemed so precious and fundamental in our society
was a necessary or appropriate means of encouraging persons to
learn English, or of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of
the franchise.1 6
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Cardona .v. Power 7 is also im-
portant as one of the few judicial pronouncements on the constitutional
issues raised by voting in a multilingual society. Justice Douglas, who
wrote the opinion for the Court in Lassiter, found that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited discrimination among literate persons, 8 as is the
11. Professor Tribe predicts that literacy tests would most likely be overturned on constitutional
grounds given that Lassiter antedates the use of strict scrutiny when fundamental rights such as voting
are implicated. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-15, at 1093 (2d ed. 1988).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1982).
13. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights Act of
1965 under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendement); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (uphold-
ing under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provision [§ 4(e)] of the Voting Rights Act which pro-
tects Puerto Rican voters).
14. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
15. 384 U.S. 672, 675 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 654.
17. Cardona, 384 U.S. at 675 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. Id.
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case when English literacy tests are applied to Spanish-speaking literate
persons.' He wrote:
The heavier burden [of an English literacy requirement] which New
York has placed on the Spanish-speaking American cannot . . . be
sustained under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . [T]here is no rational basis-considering the im-
portance of the right at stake-for denying those with equivalent
qualifications except that the language is Spanish.2"
Thus, prior to the enactment of the 1975 legislation which provides
more extensive multilingual voting assistance, Congress and the Supreme
Court had begun to recognize that a non-English speaker's right to vote is
violated when elections are held only in English. Morgan and the
Cardona dissent perceived that government action short of an absolute
denial of the vote can effectively disenfranchise electors.
B. The 1975 Amendments: A Federal Right to Multilingual Voting
Assistance
In response to overwhelming evidence of discrimination in voting di-
rected against racial and ethnic minority non-English speakers,2 ' Congress
enacted the 1975 amendments to'the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The
1975 Amendments created a multilingual voting system that has brought
about a significant increase in voter participation23 by non-English speak-
19. The plaintiff in Cardona was a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican voter who sought a judicial
declaration that the New York English literacy requirement, as applied to her, denied her right to
vote under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 673.
The majority opinion held that the record did not indicate whether the plaintiff was literate in
Spanish. If she were, the case would be covered by § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and would
therefore be moot. Because the New York courts did not determine whether the federal statute ap-
plied, the Court vacated and remanded the cause of action. Id. at 674.
20. Id. at 676; see also Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adju-
dication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 96-97 (discussing Justice
Douglas' Cardona dissent).
21. Only language minorities that are also racial and ethnic minorities are protected by the Voting
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (e). The list of groups as specified by the Bureau of the Census
includes the following: Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, Asian-Indian, Spanish/His-
panic, American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut and Hawaiian. See Bureau of the Census, Directions for
Determining Coverage under Voting Rights Act, 1982, Attachment A3 (Aug. 13, 1984) (on file with
author).
22. The 1975 Amendments require certain jurisdictions to provide all voting assistance, oral and/
or written, on a multilingual basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f(4). The 1975 amendments also make
permanent a nationwide ban on literacy tests and other discriminatory tests or devices. The definition
of "test or device" was expanded in 1975 to include English-only elections where large numbers of
language minority persons live. See 1975 S. REP., supra note 10.
23. Voting should be encouraged, particularly in light of the tragically low voter turnout in this
country. See J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 32-33 (1983). On election day in 1980, the
53.2% turnout was the third lowest in American history. Id. at 33. Turnout rates for "off-year"




ers and enhanced their political influence in their communities. 4 How-
ever, the Act has proven inadequate to fully safeguard the constitutional
rights of non-English speakers.
The 1975 Amendments mandate the use of multilingual ballots in areas
that meet certain requirements.25 The determinative requirement has
proven to be that five percent of the eligible voters belong to a single lan-
guage minority. 8 In 1980, 386 jurisdictions (most jurisdictions are coun-
ties or towns) were determined to meet the requisite five percent figure.2
Although the Act covers a large number of jurisdictions, the use of a trig-
ger calculated as a percentage of the voting population is problematic. Ju-
risdictions with millions of voters can deny multilingual voting assistance
to tens of thousands of non-English speakers so long as they fall below the
five percent threshold.2"
Furthermore, the Act only protects certain racial and ethnic minorities.
Given the past discrimination against these groups in voting, it is under-
standable that Congress especially concern itself with the protection of ra-
cial and ethnic groups. Nonetheless, all non-English speakers, regardless
of race or ethnicity, are effectively disenfranchised by elections held only
in English. The voting rights of all non-English speaking American citi-
zens are infringed when the state denies voting assistance in a language
they can understand. "
The inadequacy of the Act has led some jurisdictions with large concen-
trations of non-English speakers that fall outside federal statutory cover-
age (such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego) to provide mul-
24. R. BRISCHmTo, BILINGUAL ELECTIONS AT WORK IN THE SOUTHWEST 62-177 (1982).
25. Jurisdictions may be covered under the Voting Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(0(4)
(1982) or Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203(c). Under section b(0(4), a jurisdiction is covered if over five
percent of the voting-age citizens are members of a single language minority group and if the previous
presidential election was conducted only in English and less than fifty percent of voting-age citizens
were registered. Section 203(c) also requires that more than five percent of voting-age citizens belong
to a single language minority group. Coverage is triggered under this provision if either the jurisdic-
tion-wide or statewide illiteracy rate exceeds the national rate. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BILINGUAL VOTING ASSISTANCE: COSTS OF AND USE DURING THE NOVEMBER 1984 GENERAL
ELECTION (1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
26. The Justice Department and Bureau of the Census have interpreted a 1982 amendment to the
Voting Rights Act to change the methodology used to determine whether a person belongs to a lan-
guage minority group. See Reynolds, New Coverage Determinations Under § 203 of the Voting
Rights Act 27-28 (May 11, 1984) (Justice Dep't Memorandum) (on file with author). As a result of
the change, over 56% of the jurisdictions that would have been covered in 1984 were not covered. K.
Hall, Chairwoman, U.S. Judiciary Subcommittee on Census and Population & D. Edwards, Chair-
man, U.S. Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Letter to the Bureau of the
Census (Aug. 29, 1984) (on file with author).
27. After the methodology change in 1982, see supra note 26, many cities with large language
minority populations were dropped from the Act's coverage. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 55 app. (1980)
with Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 49 Fed. Reg. 25,887 (1984).
28. For example, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego, do not meet the requisite five
percent figure. These cities are so large that despite the fact that a city like Los Angeles had roughly
69,000 Spanish monolinguals in 1984, they do not total five percent of the population. See Reynolds,
supra note 26, at 27. On the other hand, a city of 100,000 need have only 5,000 non-English speakers
to trigger the Act.
29. See infra Section II.
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tilingual ballots even though not required to do so under the Act.
Additionally, some states have laws that supplement the requirements of
the Voting Rights Act.s" However, English-only supporters in several
states are currently aiming to prohibit this local action.3'
The 1975 Voting Rights Act amendments were a major step forward in
allowing most language minorities to vote unhindered by language barri-
ers. The current political trend, however, reveals the limitations of the
Act. The voluntary provision of multilingual ballots in areas outside the
reach of the Voting Rights Act is threatened by English language amend-
ments. The extent to which non-English speakers have a constitutionally
protected right to multilingual voting assistance has yet to be judicially
determined. The following section develops an argument for the full vindi-
cation of non-English speakers' right to vote.
II. MULTILINGUAL VOTING ASSISTANCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO VOTE
The Constitution gives the states the authority to regulate elections sub-
ject to the power of Congress to override state regulations.3 2 Both state
and federal regulations are required to meet constitutional standards. In
articulating constitutional norms in the voting rights area, the Supreme
Court has relied primarily on the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has employed a "strict scrutiny"
standard of review 3 in cases implicating fundamental rights, 4 such as the
30. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 36 (West Supp. 1988) (providing that registra-
tion affidavits must be in Spanish for Spanish speakers); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §18:106 (West Supp.
1988) (interpreters provided for persons who do not speak, read, or write English); N.M. STAT. ANN.
ch. 1 arts. 1J-19, 2-5, 4J-15, 8-10, 10-3, 11-14, 12-12, 16-8 (West Supp. 1986) (providing for elec-
tions conducted entirely in both Spanish and English).
31. Voter-initiated referendums to declare English the official language of a state have been pro-
posed or are being considered in 33 states, and 13 have adopted them. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, at
A32, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, at § 11, p. 1, col. 1.
32. Article I, section 4 of the Constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to invest
Congress with broad power to regulate the entire area of voting practices by the states in federal
elections. See L. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 13-10, at 1084-85. When states employ voting practices that
contravene Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, Congress may act in pursuance of its enforcement
powers in § 5 to regulate both federal and state elections.
33. The Supreme Court applies a "strict scrutiny" standard of review to classifications that in-
fringe rights considered "fundamental" or classifications singling out "suspect classes," which are
limited to race or national-origin groups. See L. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 16-6, at 1451-54. An
intermediate level of scrutiny is applied to classifications that implicate the rights of "quasi-suspect"
groups, such as classifications on the basis of sex or physical disabilities. Id. § 16-33, at 1610-18.
Classifications that do not implicate either specially protected rights or specially protected persons are
granted broad deference by the courts under a third standard of review, the "rational basis" standard.
Id. § 16-2, at 1439-43.
34. The Court has identified a number of fundamental rights in addition to the right to vote,
including, for example, procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942); rights with respect to criminal procedure, see, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956);
the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
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right to vote. 5 The government classification will be upheld only if it is
the "least restrictive means" of promoting a "compelling" state interest.3"
This Note argues that elections held only in English effectively deny a
fundamental right of non-English speakers. A state's preference in favor
of English-speaking voters is, thus, unequal treatment that should trigger
strict scrutiny review. 7
A. Strict Scrutiny of Fundamental Rights
Political minorities have long used the equal protection clause to obtain
judicial protection from majoritarian legislative processes that tend to dis-
count their interests. 8 In scrutinizing infringements of fundamental
rights, courts show less than usual deference to legislative judgments in
several respects. First, courts have ruled that state action violates the equal
protection clause even if it causes an effective, but not an absolute, in-
fringement of a fundamental right." The equal protection clause is also
violated whenever state action gives preference to the exercise of the fun-
damental rights of some and not others, when it burdens the exercise of
those rights for some but not for others, or when it penalizes some individ-
uals who choose to exercise their constitutional rights."'
35. Non-English speakers have never been considered a "suspect class" per se. Thus, their claims
have not received strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (rejecting plaintiff's challenge to English-only Social Security notices), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
929 (1984); Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting plaintiffs' claim to a constitutional and statutory right to bilingual education). However,
since the vast majority of non-English speaking persons in this country are members of racial or
ethnic minorities, non-English speakers are in most cases a directly derivative group of a clearly
suspect class. Hence, in cases where plaintiffs can prove an intent to discriminate against them on the
basis of their race or national origin, and not simply on account of their language, the courts should
apply strict scrutiny. See supra note 33.
More recently, courts have been more receptive to the argument that one's language and one's
national origin are closely related. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1520-21 (9th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (strict scrutiny triggered where Spanish-speaking and Chinese-speaking voters
targeted for voter fraud investigation), vacated as moot, 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987).
Should a court find that neither the fundamental rights strand nor the suspect class strand trigger
strict scrutiny, the court should at the very'least apply an intermediate level of scrutiny accorded
"quasi-suspect classes." See supra note 33; see also Note, supra note 7 at 1354; Note, Quasi-Suspect
Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981) (using language
minorities as model of quasi-suspect group).
36. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
37. Recognition that restrictions on multilingual ballots implicate the fundamental right to vote,
triggering the most exacting judicial scrutiny, is an essential part of any equal protection analysis on
voting rights. An analysis that categorizes the provision of ballots together with other state "bilingual
programs" fails to take into account the constitutionally elevated status of voting rights. See Note,
supra note 7, at 1352.
38. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 135-36 (1980).
39. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("There is no meaningful distinction
between a rule which would [absolutely] deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court
and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have
money enough to pay the costs in advance."); see also infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1974) (state may not
penalize right to travel); Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (statute allowing voting
assistance only to physically handicapped gave preference to physically handicapped over illiterate
voters); Smith v. Arkansas, 385 F. Supp. 703, 704-05 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (candidate write-in statute
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Once a court is satisfied that a legislative action violates a fundamental
right, it will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review which requires the
state to show that the action is necessary to advance a legitimate compel-
ling state interest and the means employed are the "least retrictive" ones
available.
1. Voting is Fundamental
The Supreme Court has long recognized "the political franchise of vot-
ing" to be a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights."'41 While the Constitution does not explicitly protect this right,4
the Court has repeatedly held that as a fundamental right, voting has a
special place within constitutional framework.43 Substantively, the Court's
decisions have found the right to vote to encompass the right "to partici-
pate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters when-
ever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will
represent any segment of the state's population. . . ."" Accordingly, the
Court has provided judicial relief to citizens who are denied their voting
rights by discriminatory devices.45
2. Unequal Provision of Voting Rights
a. Differing Treatment
The equal protection clause prohibits states from treating voters in like
circumstances differently. Some might argue, however, that the equal pro-
tection clause does not require affirmative action by the states: that is, it
prohibits discrimination but does not require states to provide special ben-
efits.4 ' However, such an argument misstates the real issue raised by Eng-
unconstitutional as unreasonable and unjustified burden on voting rights of illiterate voters).
41. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555
(1964). See generally Wall, Equal Protection: Analyzing the Dimensions of a Fundamental
Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 163 (1977); Note, Voter Registration: A Re-
striction on the Fundamental Right to Vote, 96 YALE L.J. 1615, 1617-28 (1987).
42. The Constitution implicitly protects the "right to vote." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1 (the
republican form of government clause). The Constitution explicitly protects the right to vote free from
discrimination on the basis of race, id. amend. XV, § 1; on the basis of sex, id. amend. XIX, § 1; by
reason of poll taxes, id. amend. XXIV, § 1; or on account of age for citizens who are 18 years of age
or older, id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
43. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see
also Wall, supra note 41, at 164-65.
44. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) (emphasis
added).
45. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirements unconstitu-
tional); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (striking down statute restricting vote to
property-owning taxpayers); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll taxes
unconstitutional).
46. The equal protection clause reads: "No state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, the language of the
clause itself seems to call for restraint from misconduct, not for the fulfillment of any affirmative
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lish-only elections. States already provide voting materials to all eligible
citizens, but only in English. English-only elections reflect a positive
choice that states make to extend voting opportunities only for English
speakers. Thus, this Note does not ask the judiciary to require that states
provide a new service or benefit; multilingual voting assistance is not a
special benefit. While a state is not required to provide every service on
an evenhanded basis, the Fourteenth Amendment demands that opportu-
nities to exercise fundamental rights be provided on an equal basis to all
eligible citizens unless there is a reason that compels an unequal distribu-
tion of rights.47 Because the states have chosen to facilitate the right to
vote for some it is incumbent on the states to facilitate that right for all.
One lower court has rested its decision on equal protection principles in
a case of significance to non-English speakers. The district court in Garza
v. Smith48 struck down an article of the Texas Constitution that allowed
voting assistance only to persons who had "some bodily infirmity, such as
renders [them] physically unable to write or to see." ' The court found
that refusal of assistance for illiterate persons violated the equal protection
clause by depriving illiterate persons of their fundamental right to vote.
b. No Alternatives Means of Voting
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence points to an important qualifier to
the general rule that voting cases are strictly scrutinized: The Court will
not find an infringement of the right to vote if there are alternative means
by which the complaining voters could have exercised their voting rights.5"
duties. This is the equivalent of saying that a state's failure to provide multilingual voting assistance
does not constitute "state action." However, given that states do provide assistance in English, failure
to provide multilingual assistance should more accurately be termed an "omission," the product of an
"active" choice by the state. Cf Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Af-
firmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 331 (1985) (failure to
fund abortions for poor women while funding childbirth procedures is "active" choice by government
to discourage exercise of individual right).
47. Since the distribution of social services does not implicate rights that the Supreme Court has
deemed "fundamental," a state may provide these services unequally as long as there is a "rational
basis" for such a distribution. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Thus, cases denying affirma-
tive benefits to non-English speakers can be distinguished. See Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th
Cir. 1975) (upholding English-only civil service examination); Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808,
512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973) (upholding English-only notices of welfare benefit reduc-
tions or terminations), cert. denied sub nom. Guerrero v. Swoape, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974).
48. 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 401 U.S.
1006, remanded, 450 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. Garza, 320 F. Supp. at 132.
50. This requirement has been applied more often in cases involving the right to equal access to
the courts in criminal cases by means of free transcripts or court-appointed attorneys on appeal. See,
e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (where indigent defendant has "no recourse"
but to prosecute his own appeal, state violated equal protection clause by denying court-appointed
counsel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (state must provide free transcripts to indigent
criminal defendants).
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This qualifier indicates the judiciary's unwillingness to provide a remedy
if there is a showing by the state that the remedy is unnecessary.51
Thus, for example, in McDonald v. Board of Election Commission-
ers,52 the Court held that the denial of absentee ballots to unsentenced
inmates of an Illinois county jail did not violate the inmates' voting rights
as there was nothing in the record to show that the state had precluded
them from voting. Since the state could "possibly furnish the jails with
special polling booths . . . or provide guarded transportation to the polls,"
the Court concluded that the "right to vote" had not been infringed and
applied a rational relation standard of review to determine whether plain-
tiffs had a "right to receive absentee ballots." 53
The Ninth Circuit reviewed a similar claim in Selph v. Council of Los
Angeles," a case brought by physically handicapped persons to require
the city of Los Angeles to modify every polling place so as to make them
accessible to handicapped people. The court found that the right to vote
was not implicated where handicapped voters have reasonable alternatives
to voting in person.55
3. Effective Disenfranchisement
As the devices used to discriminate against particular individuals in vot-
ing have become more sophisticated, the Supreme Court has had to grant
relief to voters even when they are not absolutely disenfranchised by the
state's actions. In most modem cases, voters find their rights impaired by
devices that have the effect of disenfranchising them, even though in the
literal sense they are not barred from the polls.5"
There is no set formula for measuring the degree of harm plaintiffs
must prove to establish that a state's classification "effectively" disen-
franchises them. Drawing on Supreme Court jurisprudence from other
fundamental rights areas, as well as voting rights cases, the test applied is
whether the classification has a "real and appreciable impact" on the ex-
ercise of the protected interest,57 such that it unfairly burdens58 or penal-
51. See, e.g. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) (defendant failed to establish need
for transcript in light of court's finding that alternative devices available).
52. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
53. Id. at 807, 808 n.6.
54. 390 F. Supp. 58 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
55. Id. at 62.
56. To the extent that Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 757 (1973), suggests that a classifica-
tion must absolutely bar voters in order to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, that case misinterprets
the rest of the Court's jurisprudence regarding degrees of disenfranchisement and stands alone in
suggesting that proposition.
In Rosario, the Court held that New York's delayed enrollment scheme that required voters to
enroll in a political party eleven months prior to the election simply did not disenfranchise anyone in
any way. Id. If newly registered voters failed to register to vote, it was because they "chose not to."
Id. at 758. Thus, the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny review.
57. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
144 (1972).
58. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
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izes that interest.5" Thus, if the "pratical effect[ T6o of a state's action is to
appreciably impair a fundamental right for certain persons, strict scrutiny
is triggered.
Courts have not required that a classification adversely impair the vot-
ing rights of all members of the group claiming the disadvantage. Plain-
tiffs need only show that the classification falls with unequal weight on
them.61 Thus, the appropriate test for judging the voting rights of non-
English speakers is: Does the denial of multilingual elections have a "real
and appreciable impact" on the exercise of their voting rights? In other
words, does the classification have the practical effect of disenfranchising
non-English speakers to a significantly greater degree than English
speakers. 62
B. Equal Protection Claims of Non-English Speakers
Equal protection doctrine requires that aggrieved voters show that state
voting practices disenfranchise them. Thus, non-English speaking voters
must show that elections conducted only in English bring about their ef-
fective disenfranchisement, thus violating their fundamental right to vote
and triggering strict scrutiny. They must also show that there are no al-
ternative means available by which they can exercise this fundamental
right.6"
In 1970, the California Supreme Court squarely faced the constitution-
ality of English literacy requirements as applied to non-English speakers
in Castro v. State." The court found that the English literacy require-
ment of the California constitution violated petitioners' right to equal pro-
tection of the law. However, the Castro decision did not require the state
59. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257 (1974).
60. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 371 (1969).
61. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (voting scheme requiring candidates to pay large
filing fees to enter party primaries falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, accord-
ing to their economic status).
62. The Supreme Court has made its strongest statements demanding that states respect the
equality of each citizen's vote in its legislative apportionment jurisprudence. In this context, the Court
has found that states could not draw legislative districts so that there were fewer voters in some
districts than in others because that would give greater weight to the votes of citizens in districts of
lesser population.
In the landmark apportionment case of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court explicitly
affirmed the principle that a state's voting scheme need not absolutely disenfranchise a particular
group to offend the Constitution. The Court in Reynolds states: "the right of suffrage can be denied
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting
the free exercise of the franchise." Id. at 555. In later apportionment cases, the Supreme Court,
applying strict scrutiny, has not permitted even de minimis population variations among districts ab-
sent compelling justification. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (de minimis popula-
tion variation in Congressional districts not allowed absent compelling state interest); Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) (same); P. BRESr & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONsTrru-
TIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 635 (1983).
63. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
64. 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
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to provide multilingual ballots. Instead the court stated: "The provision of
ballots, notices, ballot pamphlets, etc. in Spanish is not necessary either to
the formation of intelligent opinions on election issues or to the implemen-
tation of those opinions through the mechanics of balloting."65 Thus, the
only relevant case law assessing constitutionally based voting rights would
require non-English speakers to prove that they are effectively disen-
franchised by English-only elections in order to obtain a judicial declara-
tion requiring states to provide multilingual assistance.
Nearly twenty years have passed since the California court's decision in
Castro. In that time, empirical evidence has been gathered which docu-
ments the need for multilingual voting assistance. Further, federal district
courts consistently have interpreted the "right to vote" of Spanish speakers
under the special 1965 provision to require bilingual ballots for Puerto
Rican voters, and Congress has enacted the 1975 amendments to the Vot-
ing Rights Act to expand multilingual voting assistance. 6
1. Empirical Evidence of Disenfranchisement By Language Barriers
A recent empirical study, conducted under the auspices of the Mexican-
American Legal Defense and Education Fund, strongly suggests that
English-only elections effectively disenfranchise non-English speakers.
The comprehensive 1982 report67 was heavily relied upon in the 1982
congressional hearings on the Voting Rights Act. 8
Conducted in three predominantly Mexican-American communities in
Los Angeles, California and Uvalde and San Antonio, Texas, the study
concludes that those most likely to be affected by the discontinuance of
bilingual voting services are Spanish monolinguals." Seventy percent of
the voting citizens who spoke only Spanish reported that they would be
less likely to register and less likely to vote if oral assistance in Spanish
65. Id. at 243, 466 P.2d at 282, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The court distinguished Lassiter since the
appellant in Lassiter made no claim to literacy in any language or to access to news media in another
language. The court held that the English proficiency provision discriminated "among literate citi-
zens, disenfranchising all who are literate in languages other than English .... " Id. at 233, 466
P.2d at 250, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
66. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
67. R. BRISCHErro, supra note 24. The report uses archival data including available census,
registration and election records collected for the ten previous years. Id. at 16; see also id. at 61 n.1
(citing A. EDWARDS, C. ORTIZ & D. LOPEZ, 3 BILINGUAL ELECTION SERVICES: A STATE OF THE
ART REPORT (1979)); id. at 34 n.1 (citing Cooper & Greenfield, Language Use and the Bilingual
Community, 53 MOD. LANGUAGE J. 166 (1969)). The report is based on secondary analysis of ex-
isting survey data, including that contained in the CENSUS BUREAU SURVEY OF INCOME AND EDUCA-
TION (1976) and the NATIONAL CHICANO SURVEY (1979), which was conducted at the University of
Michigan. Id. at 4.
68. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 244-45.
69. R. BRISCHETO, supra note 24, at 49. The following results bear out this conclusion:
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were discontinued.7 0 Seventy-two percent indicated they would be less
likely to vote if the bilingual ballot were discontinued. 1
2. Judicial Acknowledgment of the Need for Multilingual Voting As-
sistance for Non-English Speakers
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 includes a provision protecting Puerto
Rican citizens who emigrate to the mainland from language discrimina-
tion in voting.72 A series of cases point to this provision for support for the
proposition that ballots printed only in English deny non-English speak-
ers the right to vote. Those cases construing section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 consistently hold that the "right to vote" entails more
than a right of equal access to ballots in English-it requires equal access
to ballots in a language the voter can understand. While these cases do not
directly bear on the constitutionality of English-only elections, they do
support the proposition that English-only elections deny non-English
speakers any meaningful opportunity to exercise their voting rights.
In enacting this special provision protecting Puerto Rican citizens, Con-
Probable Effect of Removal of Bilingual Services by Language Ability
Percent of Citizens by Language Ability
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71. Id. The study further showed that those who were most likely to be disenfranchised by the
elimination of bilingual election services were the poor, the least educated, and the aged. Id. at 47-48.
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gress declared only that the states could not condition the right to vote on
English proficiency; it did not specify that the states should provide mul-
tilingual ballots. Nonetheless, the courts have recognized that the right to
vote includes the right to understand the vote one is casting and accord-
ingly have required multilingual materials and assistance.
The Seventh Circuit in Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action
v. Kusper"s found the right to vote to include "the right to be informed as
to which mark on the ballot, or lever on the voting machine, will effectu-
ate the voter's political choice."17 4
The Pennsylvania District Court in Arroyo v. Tucker,7 5 agreeing with
the reasoning of Kusper and its progeny, stated that "'the right to vote'
means more than the mechanics of marking a ballot or pulling a lever."'76
Non-English speakers cannot cast an effective vote "without ... [the]
ability to comprehend the registration and election forms and the ballot
itself. 77
In short, every lower court that has interpreted the statutory right that
prohibits states from conditioning the right to vote of Puerto Rican citi-
zens on an ability to understand English,78 has concluded that that right,
by force of reason, must entail voting assistance in a language the voter
understands.
C. State Interests and the Means Employed to Achieve Them
State action that infringes on fundamental rights is presumptively ille-
gitimate.79 Under the so-called "strict scrutiny" standard of review, a state
must show that the action advances legitimate and "compelling" state
objectives. The state must then show that the choice of means are best
suited to the stated ends.8°
73. 490 F.2d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 1973).
74. Id. (citing Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131, 136 (W.D. Tex. 1970)). Similarly, in Torres v.
Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the district court held: "In order that the phrase 'the right
to vote' be more than an empty platitude, a voter must be able effectively to register his or her
political choice. . . ." Id. at 312. The court in Torres found that all-English elections violated not
only the Voting Rights Act language provision, but the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
75. 372 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that Philadelphia's English-only election system
infringed Puerto Rican voters right to vote under § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act).
76. Id. at 767.
77. Id. Other decisions, interpreting the 1965 Act, further develop the idea that persons who do
not read or write English have a right to cast an effective ballot. United States v. Louisiana, 265 F.
Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. La. 1966) (statute denying illiterates voting assistance was literacy test violating
the Voting Rights Act) ("We cannot impute to Congress the self-defeating notion that an illiterate has
the right [to] pull the lever of a voting machine, but not the right to know for whom he pulls the
lever."); United States v. Mississippi, 256 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (defining "vote" as "any
and all action necessary to make a vote effective in any . . . election . . . [including] casting a
ballot").
78. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (state interests were "legitimate and sub-
stantial . . . but, since the means selected . . . unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the
statute cannot be sustained").
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1. Promotion of a Unilingual Government
In justifying their position, the proponents of English-only elections
point to the state's compelling interest in a unilingual government' and
the possibility that the accommodation of non-English speakers could re-
sult in a bilingual or trilingual nation. 2 Even assuming that a state lan-
guage policy is constitutional and that the voting machinery is a constitu-
tionally permissible means by which to implement it, equal protection
analysis requires that English-only elections must be the least restrictive
means of creating a unilingual government. There is no proof that Eng-
lish-only elections encourage or promote the learning of English. Elections
take place only once every year or two, thereby not directly affecting indi-
vidual non-English speakers regularly enough to encourage the learning
81. The unfairness of state action that penalizes non-English speakers in order to promote a
unilingual government lies in the fact that the de jure and de facto school segregation of language
minority children in public schools has contributed to the retention of the groups' mother tongues and
has hindered the acquisition of English skills. See Laosa, Social Policies Toward Children of Diverse
Ethnic, Racial and Language Groups in the United States, in CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
AND SOCIAL POLICY I (H. Stevenson & A. Siegel eds. 1984); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 479 (1954) (noting segregation of Mexican-American children and white children in public
schools); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 289 (1969) (recognizing causal relationship
between unequal educational opportunities and exercise of right to vote of racial minorities); cf. Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (failure to provide English language instruction to non-English
speaking Chinese-American students violates Civil Rights Act of 1964). See generally J. FISHMAN,
LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1966) (discussing language retention by United
States immigrant groups).
82. They consider this to be an undesirable possibility. See Hayakawa, English, By Law, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at A35, col. 2 ("The longer they [non-English-speaking children] are instructed
in the native tongue [through bilingual education programs], the more difficult it becomes for them to
learn English in their later years. . . . The use of bilingual ballots compounds the problem.") (Re-
mark of the Honorary Chairman of U.S. English, former Senator Hayakawa); cf. Bikales, Make
English Official by Passing New Laws, U.S.A. Today, Apr. 10, 1985, at 8A, col. 1 ("But things are
different today, and we can no longer assume that recent arrivals will automatically follow a path
leading to their uneventful insertion into U.S. society.") (Remark by G. Bikales, Executive Director of
U.S. English); Fundraising letter for English First from J. Horn, Texas State Representative (1986)
("Tragically, many immigrants these days refuse to learn English!") (on file with author); see also
Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing
linguistic and cultural diversity as source of weakness for nation-state).
The view that recent Mexican immigrants are not learning English as rapidly as did other prior
immigrant groups has been refuted by a recent Rand Corporation study, K. MCCARTHY & R.
BURCIAGA VALDEZ, CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFECTS OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN CALIFORNIA
(1986). 'he research found that persons of Mexican origin are making essentially the same progress
of integration as earlier European immigrants and as the state's recent Asian immigrants. Id. at
54-55. The study also examined the transition of Spanish speakers to English, concluding that most of
the first-generation native-born are bilingual, and more than 90% are proficient in English. Among
the second-generation, more than half are monolingual English speakers. Thus, the transition to Eng-
lish is almost immediate. Id. at 60; see also English Courses: Immigrants-a Rush to the Class-
rooms, L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (In the Los Angeles Unified School District alone,
officials estimate that 40,000 adults will be turned away from English as a second language (ESL)
classes in 1986.).
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of English."8 On the contrary, the direct effect on disenfranchised individ-
uals is likely to be their further alienation from the political process.84
Further, the deprivation of voting rights increases the possibility that,
as a group, non-English speakers who already suffer economic disadvan-
tages because of their linguistic handicap will also suffer political disad-
vantages because of their lack of representation. 5 They will be less likely
to receive government benefits such as social services and educational fa-
cilities which are meted out by political representatives. 8 Since the availa-
bility of such benefits is widely recognized as essential to a group's ability
to assimilate, English-only elections are more likely to slow the process of
assimilation, rather than to "encourage" it.87
2. The Costs of Multilingual Elections
A state may argue that multilingual ballots and assistance are prohibi-
tively costly, thus justifying the provision of ballots only in English. Cost
efficiency, however, has not been accepted by the judiciary as a compelling
governmental interest sufficient to survive even an intermediate degree of
scrutiny.88
Assuming arguendo that a court were to scrutinize the costs of multi-
83. See Sierra v. El Paso Indep. School Dist., 591 F. Supp. 802, 807 (W.D. Tex. 1984) (finding
lingering effects of past official discrimination in form of poll tax and English-only ballots deterred
Mexican-Americans from registering, voting, and otherwise participating in political process); see also
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) (addressing alienating effects of discriminatory
voting practices); Graves v. Barnes, 378 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (examining discriminatory
impact of multi-member districts on Mexican-American access to political process); Karst, Paths to
Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REv. 303, 332-36 (1986).
84. Karst, supra note 83, at 332-36.
85. Disenfranchisement of non-English speakers deprives them of a vital instrument for change
through the political process and points to the need for the special judicial protection granted to
"discrete and insular" minorities. See generally supra note 33; J. ELY, supra note 38.
86. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) ("Section 4(e) may be viewed as a measure
to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York non-discriminatory treatment by
government-both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration of
governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement."); see also Karst,
supra note 83, at 334.
87. This argument assumes that the best interests of non-English speakers are served by assimila-
tion. While both English-only supporters and opponents agree that non-English speakers are better
off if they learn English, some racial and ethnic groups have in the last few decades asserted their
rights to maintain their native tongues while becoming proficient in English. See, e.g., Karst, supra
note 83, at 337; Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1978). Moreover,
discrimination in the choice of language deprives a person of human dignity by distorting one's con-
ception of identity. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Freedom from Discrimination in Choice of Lan-
guage and International Human Rights, I S. ILL. U.L.J. 151, 151-52 (1976).
88. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-90 (1973) (administrative convenience does
not outweigh female military persons' equal protection rights to equal treatment). In Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965), the Court rejected the state's claims that denying the vote to persons in
the Army promoted administrative efficiency: "States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of
the vote because of some remote administrative benefit . . . ."; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 633 (1969) ("The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classifica-
tion."); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974) ("The conservation of the
taxpayers' purse is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational residency requirement
which, in effect, severely penalizes exercise of the right [to travel]."); Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp.
554 (D. Conn. 1971), aff/d, 404 U.S. 1054 (1972) (same).
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lingual ballots, the relevant equal protection question to ask with respect'
to costs is not how much more a state would have to spend to provide
multilingual assistance, but how much is already spent per voter to pro-
vide English ballots and whether the comparative costs of multilingual
voting would be so excessive as to override a fundamental right.89 The
information available on costs, however, looks to the question of incremen-
tal rather than comparative costs. There is a tendency to focus only on the
costs of multilingual ballots, without taking into consideration the costs of
English ballots; the amount of money spent per English-speaking voter
has apparently never seemed relevant.
Nevertheless, the data does suggest that the cost of multilingual ballots
are only a small percentage of total election expenses. A study by the
General Accounting Office reports that the additional costs incurred by 83
jurisdictions that provided bilingual ballots which had record of such costs
were 7.6% of the total costs to these jurisdictions to hold the November 4,
1984 election.90 In 259 of the jurisdictions surveyed by the General Ac-
counting Office which provided oral assistance, no costs were incurred.91
Thus, available data strongly suggests that the costs of providing multil-
ingual voting assistance fall within the range of expenditures that can be
compelled. 2
Furthermore, Congress was clearly not concerned that multilingual
elections were excessively costly.93 One might assume that the use of the
89. Many people express an instinctive worry that a constitutional rule that requires states to
provide multilingual voting assistance to every non-English speaker would be excessively costly and
administratively burdensome in areas with only a few non-English speakers. As with most constitu-
tional requirements, however, states would have the flexibility to develop systems for identifying vot-
ers needing the assistance and for implementing the multilingual system. Courts should nonetheless
place a heavy burden on the states to accomodate every voter needing assistance unless such accommo-
dation would be clearly unreasonable. For example, if there were only one person within a 500 mile
radius that needed assistance, and no one was available in that area to interpret the ballot, assistance
might not be a reasonable demand on the state.
90. GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 19.
91. Id. at 18. Moreover, the growing use of multilingual voting assistance has caused costs to
decline over time, due to "better targeting of materials, and more reliance upon translations and
materials used in prior elections." S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 243-44. The Senate Report also notes the dramatically decreased costs
in Los Angeles from 1976 to 1980, the 1980 figure constituting only 1.9 percent of the total general
election budget. Id.
92. Id. As the need for multilingual election materials has grown, the economies of scale involved
in the production of these materials has fallen, thus reducing the costs to individual counties. See GAO
REPORT, supra note 25, at 25. Additionally, for small counties oral voting assistance may be provided
at almost no cost as most interpreters volunteer their service gratuitously. Id. at 18. Finally, firms in
the voting materials industry are exploring the possibilities for computerized voting machines. VOT-
ING SYSTEM STANDARDS, A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY ENGI-
NEERING AND PROCEDURAL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR VOTING SYSTEMS (1984). Such ad-
vanced technology could dramatically reduce the costs of providing written multilingual services,
making it clearly unreasonable not to provide such services.
93. The Senate Judiciary Committee strongly refuted the "excessive costs" arguments with empir-
ical evidence and further concluded: "Even if the costs of bilingual elections were higher . . . the
Committee believes that certain costs should be willingly incurred to make our most fundamental
political rights a reality for all Americans." S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 244.
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five percent trigger was intended as a cost-minimizing device. In fact,
Congress used the five percent mark to identify areas where federal statu-
tory intrusion was most needed so as not to interfere in states' decisions on
voting procedures unless the situation rose to a level where federal action
was warranted. 4
Admittedly, states cannot provide voting materials without discriminat-
ing, or drawing lines, at some point. Within a constitutional framework,
the states must have discretion in the operation of voting facilities and in
the printing of ballots and other materials. However, states have an over-
riding obligation to provide voting opportunities on an evenhanded basis
to all citizens and to extend meaningful voting assistance to non-English
speakers.
III. POLICY SUGGESTIONS
In communities with non-English speaking groups, the logistics in-
volved in operating the voting process may become complicated. Thus,
Congress might consider changing the multilingual voting provisions of
the Voting Rights Act to replace the percentage trigger with a numerical
trigger and to expand coverage to all non-English speakers. For example,
instead of requiring multilingual elections in areas that meet the five per-
cent requirement, the Act should be triggered in areas with, say, 1,000
non-English speakers. In areas with fewer than 1,000 non-English speak-
ers, the states should be required to make reasonable efforts to provide
assistance, either written or oral. States might be required to inquire
about the voters' needs for language assistance at registration, for instance.
However, the burden of notifying election officials of one's need for assis-
tance should probably rest with the voter where there is no large, estab-
lished non-English speaking community that triggers the Act. Community
ethnic leagues could serve as liasons with the state to facilitate this com-
munication. In short, multilingual elections should involve extensive com-
munication and cooperation between state officials and community
members.
94. A cost minimizing rationale for the five percent trigger is mentioned nowhere in the legislative
history. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1975) [hereinafter
1975 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Jordan); id. at 573 (statement of Mr. Pottinger); 9111
CONG. REC. S1279 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1975) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
Representatives Roybal and Badillo lifted the five percent trigger from lower court decisions in
Arroyo v. Tucker, 372 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974) and Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). 1975 House Hearings, supra, at 884, 934. These decisions required bilingual bal-
lots and materials for all Puerto Rican voters, but required bilingual election officials only in election
districts in which Puerto Rican voters constituted at least five percent of the voting population. Ar-
royo, 372 F. Supp. at 768; Torres, 381 F. Supp. at 313.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have been deeply involved in extending the franchise to margi-
nal groups that majoritarian processes exclude. A representative democ-
racy mandates that every adult citizen have a voice in the future of the
polity.95 If courts gave the voting rights of non-English speakers federal
constitutional protection, the states and Congress could better address
themselves to the vindication of those rights. Additionally, through further
amendment of the Voting Rights Act, Congress can most efficiently imple-
ment federal policies that protect language minorities from disenfranchise-
ment, eliminating the need for individual state legislation. A judicial de-
termination that the prohibition of multilingual voting assistance violates
the constitutional rights of non-English speakers would firmly establish a
state or national language policy that incorporates, rather than excludes,
speakers of all languages into one cohesive body politic.
95. Professor Karst points to two fundamental values encompassed in rights of citizenship: protec-
tion of human dignity and self-respect, and protection of avenues for participation in the decisionmak-
ing processes of the community. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizen-
ship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 23 (1977). In another piece he says
that respect for rights of citizenship:
promote[s] the freedom of individual choice about cultural identification. . . . When the prom-
ise of equal citizenship is fulfilled, the paths to belonging are opened in two directions for
members of cultural minorities. As full members of the larger society, they have the option to
participate to whatever degree they choose. They may also look inward, seeking solidarity
within their cultural groups, without being penalized for that choice.
Karst, supra note 83, at 337.
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